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Doing Business in Indian Country:
Introduction to American Indian
Law Concepts Affecting Taxation
Erik M. Jensen*
This article describes some of the issues that will affect
whether national, state, and tribal governments can tax inves-
tors who do business, or who invest in doing business, within
Indian country (a term generally meaning American Indian res-
ervations, although it can be broader than that1).
First, a caveat: Those looking for absolutely clear answers in Ameri-
can Indian law are likely to be frustrated. Indeed, much of what I say
below is at least debatable, and some may think it’s just wrong. Although
some general principles can be stated, the analysis of a specific issue (e.g.,
can state X tax the income of non-Indian contractor A who does business
with Indian tribe C?) is likely to be very particularistic, depending on such
factors as treaty language (if a treaty is involved at all); relevant statutory,
executive order, or regulatory language; the specific facts at issue; and the
scope given to interpretational principles intended to resolve disputes (such
as the Indian “canons of construction” described below). Moreover, most
commentators agree that, both because of the particularistic analyses in
the cases2  and the ebbs-and-flows of judicial sympathy for tribal concerns,3
the Supreme Court decisions do not come close to establishing a coherent
body of law.
Nevertheless, despite the uncertainty at the (often wide) margins, one
can find generally applicable principles about the tax liabilities a non-Indian
investor might incur by doing business or investing in Indian country:
* Erik M. Jensen is David L. Brennan Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law.
1 I use the terms “Indian country” and “reservation” interchangeably in this article
without trying to spell out the potential differences between the two concepts.
2 See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980)
(noting “particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at
stake” in doing preemption analysis).
3 The consensus is that today’s Supreme Court is much less friendly to tribal inter-
ests than has been the case for decades.
© Civic Research Institute, Inc.  Reprinted with permission from
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=391343
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1. The non-Indian investor will generally be subject to otherwise
applicable federal taxes, but there are some special benefits for
investing in Indian country, such as accelerated depreciation rules
directed at “qualified Indian reservation property”;4
2. He or she will probably be subject to tribal taxes, unless the tribe
specifically exempts the investor from those taxes (a subject that
therefore ought to be part of the negotiations between tribes and
potential investors); and
3. He or she will probably (although not necessarily automatically)
be subject to otherwise applicable state taxes.
In the following pages, I first discuss some general doctrines that
pervade American Indian law and that may affect the powers of the vari-
ous governments—national, state, and tribal—in Indian country: the fed-
eral plenary power doctrine, the significance of treaties between the United
States and the tribes, and the Indian canons of construction. In Part II, I
turn to tribal taxing powers, deriving from the tribes’ status as sovereigns,
which should generally include the power to tax those doing business in
Indian country. In Part III, I consider the doctrines potentially limiting
state taxation of transactions occurring in Indian country, none of which
(absent a clear expression of congressional intent) is likely to preclude a
state from taxing nonmembers of a tribe. Finally, in Part IV, I provide a
brief summary of the taxing powers of federal, state, and tribal govern-
ments as they apply not only to non-Indian investors, but also to tribal
members and the tribes themselves.
I. Some Significant American Indian Law Doctrines
In this part, I discuss some doctrines that affect, or could affect, taxing
issues in Indian country: the federal plenary power doctrine, the continu-
ing vitality of treaties entered into in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries with the Indian tribes, and the Indian canons of construction.
A. Federal Plenary Power Doctrine
Whatever the inherent, traditional powers of tribes within their own coun-
try (see the discussion of tribal sovereignty in Part II below), it is now
generally accepted that the federal government has plenary power over
the tribes, largely because of Congress’s constitutional power to regulate
4 IRC Section 168(j). The recovery period for such property is shortened (e.g., the
period for 5-year property will be three years, Section 168(j)(2)), and the full deprecia-
tion deduction is available for both alternative minimum tax and regular tax purposes.
Section 168(j)(3).
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“Commerce ... with the Indian tribes.”5  Subject only to limitations like
due process, this power is so broad that it includes the power to abrogate
treaties and, indeed, to terminate the federally recognized status of tribes—
as long as it is done so clearly.6
The effect of the federal plenary power doctrine is that doing busi-
ness in Indian country can take whatever form Congress thinks it should
take. Congress could exempt on-reservation transactions, and the parties
participating in those transactions, from federal taxation; it could provide
that states have no power to tax any person doing business in Indian coun-
try or any transaction occurring there; it could take away the tribes’ other-
wise sovereign power to impose taxes; it could impose whatever regulatory
restrictions on doing business that it thinks appropriate; and so on.
If nothing else, Congress could make Indian country more attractive
as a place for investment simply by clarifying the respective governments’
taxing powers. Unfortunately, that hasn’t happened. Some interpretational
difficulties are inevitable with any complex body of law, of course—sim-
plification can go only so far—but Congress could do a much better job of
clarification than it has to this point.
B. Continuing Vitality of Treaties
Many tribes, particularly western tribes, entered into treaties with
the United States. (Treating with Indian tribes ended in 1871, primarily
because the House of Representatives was jealous that treaty-making left
the Senate with much greater power over Indian policy.) For the average
person on the street, the very idea that these treaties have effect today is
startling. When the treaties were signed, tribal members weren’t U.S. citi-
zens and there was a clear sense that the United States was dealing with
distinct nations. Now that the American Indians are U.S. citizens, how-
ever, these treaties have metamorphosed into agreements between the
United States and groups (special though those groups may be) made up
of American citizens.
As jurisprudentially peculiar as this situation is, the treaties continue
to be honored, and treaty language often plays a central role in evaluating
the limits of governmental power within Indian country. Unless Congress
has acted clearly to abrogate a treaty with an American Indian tribe, that
treaty has effect today.
5 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6 See, e.g., U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (“We have required that Congress’s
intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and plain.”); Menominee Tribe of Indi-
ans v. U.S., 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968) (holding that treaty rights survived termination of
federal supervision absent clear evidence to the contrary).
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Sometimes treaties contain specific limitations on taxing power, and
sometimes they contain language (such as that restricting the power of
nontribal governments within tribal lands) that could be interpreted as lim-
iting national or state governments’ power to tax. This is clearly an issue
for which particularistic analysis is required, all dependent on the treaty
language applicable to a tribe. In deciding what tax liabilities may arise
from a particular investment, don’t ignore any treaty!
C. Indian Canons of Construction
Historically the so-called Indian canons of construction were important in
interpreting ambiguous passages in treaties, statutes, and regulations. In
general, the canons provide that doubtful expressions should be interpreted
in favor of the tribes or, as appropriate, individual tribal members. The
canons were developed to interpret treaty language, which is often ab-
stract and contains many terms that aren’t part of everyday discourse,7  but
the canons have been extended to statutory and regulatory interpretation
as well.8
Thus, if there’s doubt about the way a taxing statute should be inter-
preted in an Indian law context, it ought to be resolved in favor of tribal
interests. That should mean, as a general matter, that the imposition of
federal or state taxes on transactions within Indian country—taxes that
might harm a tribe’s economic position even if the taxes are nominally
imposed on nontribal parties—ought to be disfavored. Because of its ple-
nary power over Indian affairs, Congress could impose, or permit states to
impose, taxes that have unhappy consequences for tribes, but, if Congress
is going to do that, its intentions should be clear.
By resolving ambiguities in favor of tribes, the canons have been a
powerful protection for tribal interests in the past. That protection seems
to be lessening, however. The canons are still the “law,” but how powerful
they are today is a matter of doubt.9
7 The idea was that Indian treaties were like contracts of adhesion and should be
construed against the more powerful party, the United States. See U.S. v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (“[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians as ‘that unlettered
people’ understood it, and ‘as justice and reason demand in all cases where power is
exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and protection . . . .’”).
8 See David H. Getches et al., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 327-28
(4th ed., 1998).
9 Occasionally the canons are totally ignored because a court doesn’t know about
them and isn’t informed of their existence by the affected parties. In Warbus, 110 TC 279
(1998), for example, a special trial judge ignored the canons in interpreting Code section
7873, which generally exempts income from a “fishing rights-related activity.” Warbus,
a tribal member, had plausibly argued that discharge of indebtedness income from the
foreclosure of a boat used in treaty-protected fishing was covered by the statute, and the
canons should have been used to strengthen that argument. See Erik M. Jensen, “Ameri-
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The current Supreme Court seems to disfavor the canons in ques-
tions of statutory interpretation. For example, in Chickasaw Nation v. U.S.,10
decided in 2001, a majority of the Court treated the canons as little more
than rules of convenience, and strained to find no ambiguity (and hence
no role for the canons to play) in an inherently ambiguous situation. The
effect was that the Court interpreted a statute that on its face made no
sense in a way that subjected two tribes to federal wagering excise taxes.
The statutory provision at issue in Chickasaw Nation, part of the In-
dian Gaming Regulatory Act,11  was a disaster, with two juxtaposed phrases
that pointed in diametric directions.12  To make an already bad situation
worse, the legislative history was also of little help in discerning what, if
anything, Congress had in mind about tribal tax liabilities. Critics of
Chickasaw Nation, including this author, have argued that this was pre-
cisely the sort of situation—where the statutory text and history mandated
no clearly right answer—that the canons were intended to address.13  If the
canons didn’t apply in Chickasaw Nation, however—when the Court was
interpreting a statute (IGRA) clearly intended to further tribal economic
development—they might not matter at all anymore, at least when statu-
tory interpretation (rather than treaty analysis) is at issue.
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, lower courts have similarly cut
back on the force of the canons. For example, in Ramsey v. U.S.,14  decided
in September 2002, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a tribal member wasn’t
exempt from federal highway-related taxes. The district court had deter-
mined that provisions in the treaty between the U.S. and the Yakama Na-
tion reserved to the Yakama the right to travel the public highways without
restriction and without being subject to licensing and other fees, and that
was enough to preclude the federal taxes. The Ninth Circuit concluded,
however, that “express exemptive language” was necessary to exempt a
tribal member from a federal excise tax, and without the express language,
it wouldn’t defer to tribal interests.15  Like the result in Chickasaw Na-
tion—indeed, because treaty language was involved in Ramsey, this case
actually goes beyond Chickasaw Nation—that conclusion basically turned
the traditional understanding of the canons on its head.
can Indian Law Meets the Internal Revenue Code: Warbus v. Commissioner”, 74 North
Dakota Law Review 691 (1998), reprinted in 83 Tax Notes 105 (1999).
10 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
11 102 Stat. 2467–2486 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721.
12 See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1).
13 See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Chickasaw Nation: Interpreting a Broken Statute, 97
Tax Notes 1195 (2002).
14 302 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002).
15 Id. at 1078.
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The bottom line: The canons have not been explicitly repudiated by
the Supreme Court, but it may well be that their time has come and gone.
II. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty, Including the Power to Tax
In this part of the article I consider tribal power to tax transactions occur-
ring within tribal territory.
It should ordinarily be the case that tribes can tax persons doing busi-
ness in Indian country—even if the persons aren’t members of the tribe—
as long as the activities being taxed actually occur on tribal land.16  Taxation
is an inherent power of a sovereign; Congress has not exercised its plenary
power to take that sovereign power away; and the power to tax ought not
to be deemed “inconsistent with the tribes’ dependent status” (a concept
used, for example, to conclude that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians17 ). An investor in Indian country is therefore likely to be
subject to any applicable tribal taxes, unless the investor negotiates for an
exemption from those taxes.
The tribes’ sovereign powers are attributable to the tribes’ traditional
status as independent nations, before the European settlement of North
America, but the concept of tribal sovereignty has never been interpreted
to leave tribes with the power to impose only those taxes that were known
in, say, 1787. Whether or not tribes traditionally imposed anything like a
corporate income tax or a severance tax or a value added tax, the power to
impose such a tax is inherent in the concept of sovereignty.18  In short, the
sovereign power to tax is not constrained by taxing conceptions of a par-
ticular historical time or place.
As with almost all issues in American Indian law, however, this state-
ment of tribal taxing power may need some qualification. In section II.A.,
I discuss whether tribal taxing power might be lessened if (1) the taxpayer
is not a member of the tribe, or (2) the taxed activity takes place on nontribal
land within reservation boundaries. And in section II.B., I consider the
extent to which tribes may use the taxing power to change the “rules of the
game” that investors might have assumed would govern their activities in
Indian country.
16 But see infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussing Atkinson Trading
and noting that three Supreme Court justices seem to think tribes may not be able to tax
nonmembers at all).
17 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
18 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 894, 907 (1982) (upholding,
among other things, tribal power to impose a severance tax on mineral lessees already
engaged in activities on reservation) (“[S]overeign power, even when unexercised, is an
enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and
will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.”).
DOING BUSINESS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 229
A. Members vs. Nonmembers and Tribal Land vs. Nontribal Land
A tribe’s sovereign powers are greatest when the tribe is dealing with its
own members, and a tribe can unquestionably tax those members. Can it
also tax nonmembers doing business on a reservation?As I argued above,
the answer ought to be Yes—that, because of their sovereign status, tribes
have a great deal of scope to tax persons doing business within Indian
country. Maybe a tribe would want to exempt those persons from taxation
so as to stimulate economic activity, but, under traditional notions of tribal
sovereignty, it should have the power to tax the persons if it wishes to do so.
But the extent of tribal power over nonmembers may depend on
whether the activities being taxed take place on Indian or non-Indian land.
Many reservations are “checkerboard” in nature, with blocks of non-In-
dian land interspersed with tribal land.19  The non-Indian land is still con-
sidered part of the reservation, and it is still technically part of Indian
country, but, under recent Supreme Court cases, tribal power is substan-
tially diminished over that land.
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,20  for example, the Court in 2001
held that the Navajo Nation could not impose a hotel tax on guests at a
hotel located on fee simple land within the reservation boundaries. Pick-
ing up on the 1981 decision in Montana v. U.S.,21  the Court stated that the
Navajo Nation’s power to tax nonmembers “reaches no further than tribal
land,”22  unless the power to tax relates to “consensual relationships” be-
tween the tribe and the nonmember, or the power over nonmembers is
necessary to deal with “conduct [that] threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe.”23
The Montana “consensual relationships” exception ordinarily ought
to cover taxation associated with doing business in Indian country; in-
deed, taxation is specifically mentioned in the Montana opinion’s discussion
of “consensual relationships.” Thus, most instances of investment in Indian
country are likely to be subject to tribal taxation (absent an agreement to the
contrary), even if the activities actually occur on fee simple land.
This is another area in flux, however. Three concurring justices in
Atkinson Trading went much further than the facts of the case required,
19 Several “allotment” acts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to
much traditional tribal land passing out of Indian hands.
20 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
21 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (rejecting tribal power to regulate hunting and fishing
on fee simple land within a reservation boundary).
22 Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 653.
23 Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
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stating that the general principle derived from Montana is that “the inher-
ent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe.”24  Tribal power to tax anyone other than tribal
members as an element of tribal sovereignty may thus be a disappearing
notion in Washington judicial circles.
B. Can a Tribe Impose New Taxes After a Deal Has Been
Negotiated?
As I suggested above, investors doing business in Indian country ordi-
narily ought to be treated as having entered into a consensual relationship
with the tribe so that, absent a contrary agreement, the tribal power to tax
should be conceded. But suppose the tribe later imposes a new tax. Will
those already engaged in on-reservation activities be subject to the tax?
The answer is Maybe, and it’s therefore important to get the ground rules
decided explicitly ahead of time.
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,25  the Supreme Court in 1982
considered the validity of a tribal severance tax that fell on non-Indian
lessees of tribal oil and gas lands. The leases, which had been approved by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, set out the terms of the arrangement, with no
mention of the possibility of a tribal tax. Indeed, the tribal constitution in ef-
fect at the time the leases were entered into defined no tribal power to tax.
When the tribe imposed the severance tax, the lessees challenged it,
in effect arguing that the tribe had changed the terms of the commercial
deal and that the tribe had lost the power to tax the mining activities when
it leased the lands. The Court rejected that argument. Whatever the tribe
had agreed to in its capacity as commercial actor, it hadn’t waived its pow-
ers as a sovereign:
[P]etitioners and the dissent confuse the Tribe’s role as commercial partner
with its role as sovereign. This confusion relegates the powers of sovereignty
to the bargaining process undertaken in each of the sovereign’s commercial
agreements. It is one thing to find that the Tribe has agreed to sell the right to
use the land and take from it valuable minerals; it is quite another to find that
the Tribe has abandoned its sovereign powers simply because it has not expressly
reserved them through a contract.26
And later in the opinion the Court said:
24 Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 659-60 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Mon-
tana, 450 U.S. at 565).
25 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
26 Id. at 145-46.
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[S]overeign power, even when unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs
all contracts subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless
surrendered in unmistakable terms.27
Since the Court has cut back on the scope of the canons of construc-
tion,28  and has also recently spoken of sovereignty as if it related only to
tribal power over tribal members,29  it may be that Merrion no longer re-
flects the Court’s views. But the case is still on the books. It therefore
behooves a potential investor in Indian country—someone whose invest-
ment is based on the assumption that he, she, or it won’t be subject to
tribal taxation—to make sure that understanding is reflected “unmistak-
ably” in the agreements with the relevant tribe.30  Merrion suggests that a
tribe can waive its otherwise available sovereign powers—it can agree,
for example, not to impose an otherwise generally applicable tax on par-
ticular parties—but a waiver isn’t going to be inferred.
III. Limitations on State Power to Tax Within Indian
Country
I now turn to the power of a state to tax transactions within Indian country.
Two doctrines have developed to determine limitations on state power
in these circumstances: federal preemption and infringement of tribal self-
government. As a result of these doctrines, it is fairly clear that states will
not be able to tax tribal members or the tribe itself for on-reservation ac-
tivities, but it is likely that a state’s power to tax nonmembers doing
business within Indian country will be unaffected.
A. General Principle: States Can Tax Nonmembers for On-
Reservation Activity
State power, including the power to tax, may be limited within Indian
country if either the exercise of state power is preempted by federal law,31
or the exercise would “infringe on the right of the Indians to govern them-
selves.”32  The preemption and infringement tests are related but indepen-
dent. Either test by itself, said the Supreme Court, “can be a sufficient
27 Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
28 See supra Part I.C.
29 See supra Part II.A.
30 Of course, it is also in the tribes’ long-term economic interests to make any un-
derstanding “unmistakable,” and thereby to make Indian country more attractive to in-
vestors.
31 See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
32 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
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basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the res-
ervation or by tribal members.”33
When first developed, preemption analysis required an examination
of the pervasiveness of federal regulatory control—the more pervasive
the federal involvement, the greater the likelihood that state power would
be preempted—but it has evolved into a balancing test: weighing federal
and tribal interests, on the one hand, against state interests on the other.
The second test, the infringement test, has been phrased as follows: “Es-
sentially, absent governing acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them.”34
A classic preemption case is McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Com-
mission,35  where the Supreme Court concluded in 1973, after a detailed
analysis of relevant treaties, statutes, and case law, that Arizona’s power to
tax the income of a Navajo Nation member earned within reservation
boundaries had been preempted. With a tribal member involved in on-
reservation activity, federal and tribal interests almost automatically trump
state interests.
The result is generally different, however, when the state taxes at
issue are imposed on non-Indians. Taxing non-Indians is unlikely to be
viewed as an infringement on tribal power, and the likelihood that the
federal regulatory structure is pervasive enough, or the federal and tribal
interests strong enough, to preclude taxation of nonmembers is small. For
example, the Court has upheld state taxes on on-reservation sales of ciga-
rettes to nonmembers of tribes, and it made no difference in the result that
a tribe had its own taxing scheme in place as well.36
B. Legal Incidence versus Economic Incidence
The cigarette tax cases also stand for the proposition that state taxes may
be imposed on nonmembers, even if the economic effect on the tribes may
be catastrophic. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville In-
33 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
34 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 220.
35 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
36 See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). States may
have problems in enforcing taxes imposed on on-reservation sales, but such problems
weren’t considered to disable the state taxing power. Some of the enforcement problems
are discussed in Department of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512
U.S. 61 (1994), a case upholding a New York regulatory scheme on wholesalers (involv-
ing record-keeping requirements and quantity limitations) who sell untaxed cigarettes to
reservation Indians.
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dian Reservation,37  for example, the Court in 1980 upheld a state tax on
reservation sales to nonmembers even though it was unquestionably the
case that enforcement of the tax would dry up sales to nonmembers (which
depended on an exemption from taxation for competitive advantage) and
cost the tribes substantial revenue.
Cases such as Colville have distinguished between the economic in-
cidence of a tax (i.e., who really bears the economic burden) and the legal
incidence (i.e., who under state law has the legal obligation to pay the
tax), with legal incidence generally being the dispositive factor. A state
can’t impose a tax on a tribe or on a tribal member for on-reservation
activities, but, as long as the state statute doesn’t provide that it’s the tribe
or tribal members being taxed, the tax is likely to be upheld—even if the
economic effects on the tribe are disastrous.38
Deferring to legal incidence may be formalism at its worst, but the
Court has understood the consequences of its rulings. Indeed, the Court
has recognized that if a state stupidly characterizes the legal incidence of a
tax as falling on a tribe, thus making the tax invalid, all the state needs to
do is rewrite the statute to redefine the tax’s legal incidence.39
Having said that it’s legal rather than economic incidence that con-
trols, I should note that there is a suggestion in White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker,40  decided in 1980, that economic incidence isn’t alto-
gether irrelevant: it might be a factor pointing in the direction of federal
preemption of a state tax. In White Mountain Apache, the tribe contracted
with non-Indian companies to perform logging services on the reserva-
tion. The legal incidence of a motor vehicle license tax (effectively a gross
receipts tax on carriers) fell on the logging companies, but the tribe con-
tractually agreed to reimburse the companies for the tax. The Court ulti-
mately concluded that federal regulation of logging in Indian country was so
pervasive that the state tax was preempted, but the Court also suggested that
the economic incidence of the tax (that is, that the tribe bore the economic
burden) was a factor to be taken into account in the preemption analysis.41
37 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
38 One possible exception: there were hints in the cigarette tax cases that, if the
taxed activity is distinctly Indian, or is more clearly attributable to value added on the
reservation than was true with the sale of cigarettes, the tribal interest in resisting state
taxation may have been sufficient to trump the state interest. See, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S.
at 155 (“It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons
coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes
have a significant interest.”).
39 See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460 (1995)
(“the State generally is free to amend its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence”). States
are presumably less free to rewrite the laws of economics.
40 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
41 See id. at 151 n.15.
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Thus the question: If a tribe enters into an arrangement with a non-
Indian contractor under which the tribe is contractually obligated to pay
any tax liability of the contractor—so that the economic burden of a state
tax would fall on the tribe—does that limit the state’s taxing power? And
the answer again: Maybe. At a minimum, shifting the economic burden
makes it more likely that the tax will be preempted. It helps, but it may not
be dispositive.
IV. General Understandings About Taxation Within Indian
Country
In this final part of the article, I provide a primer on some of the basic rules
dealing with taxation in Indian country.
A. Federal Taxation
Absent treaty language or express statutory language to the contrary, tribal
members are subject to federal taxes of general application, such as the
income tax.42  However, the Internal Revenue Code does contain some
specific provisions exempting certain sorts of income, such as that from
fishing-rights related activities, from taxation.43
In general, nonmembers of a tribe who do business within Indian
country and who are subject to U.S. taxation will be subject to federal
taxes just as they would be for transactions entered into elsewhere. The
Code includes specific incentives, however, like accelerated depreciation,
for investment in Indian country.44
The tribes themselves, and tribal corporations formed under the In-
dian Reorganization Act, are exempt from federal income taxation.45  This
exemption may make it possible to structure transactions so as to economi-
cally transfer the benefits of the tribal exemption to non-Indian investors.
42 See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
43 See, e.g., Section 7873 (excluding from gross income “income derived ... by a
member of an Indian tribe directly or through a qualified Indian entity, or ... by a quali-
fied Indian entity ... from a fishing rights-related activity of such tribe”).
44 See, e.g., Section 168(j) (special accelerated depreciation rules for “property on
Indian reservations”).
45 The reasons for this aren’t “altogether clear.” Scott A. Taylor, An Introduction
and Overview of Taxation and Indian Gaming, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 251, 252 (1997). See
Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 CB 19 (“Neither an unincorporated Indian tribe nor a corpora-
tion organized under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 is subject to
federal income tax on its income, regardless of the location of the activities that pro-
duced the income.”). But see id. (“[A] corporation organized by an Indian tribe under
state law is subject to federal income tax on its income, regardless of the location of the
activities that produced the income.”).
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Although the tribes are exempt from income taxation, they may be
subject to federal excise taxes, as Chickasaw Nation v. U.S.,46  dealing
with federal wagering taxes, shows.47  But there is no generally applicable
principle at work here. Some excise taxes clearly apply to Indian tribes,
some don’t, and some have uncertain application to the tribes.
B. State Taxation
State taxes are generally inapplicable to tribes, tribal property, and tribal
members as long as the activities or property being taxed is within Indian
country.48  But states can generally tax non-Indians doing business on res-
ervations, and states can tax tribal members, and maybe the tribes them-
selves, on income from transactions outside Indian country.49
I noted above (in Part III.B.) the question whether the economic inci-
dence of a state tax has any relevance in determining the effect of the tax
within Indian country. Apparently the economic incidence isn’t decisive
by itself, but, in a case in which the argument for federal preemption of a
state tax is otherwise marginal, a conclusion that the economic incidence
falls on a tribe may tip the balance in favor of preemption. Thus, if an
agreement between a tribe and a non-Indian contractor makes the tribe
bear the economic burden of any state taxes imposed on the contractor, it’s
possible that, if other factors point toward preemption as well, the state tax
will be preempted.50
C. Tribal Taxation
As discussed in Part II, because of their inherent sovereign powers, tribes
should ordinarily be able to tax transactions, and those investing in trans-
actions, within Indian country. There should be absolutely no doubt about
tribal power over any tribal members who are investors. In general, tribes
should also be able to tax non-Indian investors who have effectively en-
tered into “consensual relationships’ with the tribes to do business. How-
46 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
47 See supra Part I.C.
48 See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (hold-
ing that state income tax on tribal member’s income earned on-reservation was pre-
empted).
49 See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
50 In contrast, a state tax on private persons who contracted with the federal govern-
ment to do road improvement in Indian country was held not to be preempted by federal
law. See Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999).
The balancing of federal and tribal interests against state interests in such a case is differ-
ent than if the contract had been entered into with the tribes themselves (and approved by
the appropriate federal officials).
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ever, the Supreme Court seems to be increasingly reluctant to accept tribal
power, including taxing power, over nonmembers who conduct activities
on fee simple land within reservation boundaries. And three members of
the Court do not see the tribes as having any significant power over non-






Copyright © 2003 Civic Research Institute, Inc. This article was originally published in Journal 
of Taxation of Investments, Vol. 20, No. 3, Spring 2003, pp. 223-236, and is reproduced here 
with permission. All other reproduction or distribution, in print or electronically, is prohibited. All 
rights reserved. Journal of Taxation of Investments is a quarterly journal devoted to analyzing 
important tax law developments related to the full range of investments. For more information, 
write Civic Research Institute, 4478 U.S. Route 27, P.O. Box 585, Kingston, NJ 08528 or call 
609-683-4450. Web: http://www.civicresearchinstitute.com/jti.html.  
  
©  
 
